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THE  WORLD  AFFAIRS  COUNCIL 
24th  OF  SEPTEMBER,  1971 
by  Guy  Vanhaeverbeke 
"US-EUROPEAN  CGi'fMUNITY  TRADE  RELATIONS  IN  THE  LIGHT  OF  BRITISH  ENTRY 
, ••  AND  OF  PRESIDENT  NIXON'S  "NEW  ECONOMIC  POLICY" 
I  am  grateful  to  the  Dayton World  Affairs  Council  for its decision to 
maintain this scheduled  luncheon program  although  the original speaker 
- a  distinguished  European official - was  unable  to attend.  Your  acceptance 
of  such  a  last minute  change  assures  me  you  consider  the  subject important 
enough  to  take  a  chance with  a  substitute speaker. 
This  in  itself is encouraging  to  a  man  who  recently had  a  depressing 
experience  in  this  respect:  one  of  my  friends  in Washington  asked  casually 
what  my  task was  in  the  ECIS.  I  answered  that my  job  consisted mainly  in 
selling  the  image  of  the  f.uropean  Community  on  the  North  American  continent. 
The  friend  in question  did  not  react  immediately.  However,  a  day  or so later 
he  sent me  a  nicely wrapped  book  as  a  present.  The  book  was  Arthur Miller's 
Death  of  a  Salesman. 
Ever  since,  I  have  been  \·JOnder!ng  just  hmo~ accurate  this  joke was.  Have 
US-European  relations  reached  the  point where  those  who  were  allies for  so 
long  in  peace  as  in war  now  are  strangers?  Is it possible  that  some  even  speak 
lightly of a  prospective  trade  ~o~ar  as  though it would  amount  to little more 
than  a  Saturday afternoon  touch  football  game?  Is  that really  the  point  to 
which  an  expanding  European  Community  and  US  involvement  in Asia  have  brought 
us? 
I  still think  there  is reasonable  cause for  optimism  on  US-EC  relations, 
provided  responsible political leaders  on  both sides  keep  their cool  amid  the I 
I 
divergent  pressures  that  surround  them.  Just  as  i~mportant,  the  channels 
of  transatlantic  communication  and  mutual  information must  be widened  and 
improved. 
Unfortunately,  the  picture of US-European  relations is heavily  clouded 
with  a  number  of  cliches.  In  Europe,  one  of  the  fashionable  cliches is  the 
so-called  "American  Challenge".  "Penetration of  US  direct  investments  in 
Europe  has  reached  such  an  enormous  level  that  the  second  economic  power  in 
the world after  the  US  is  bound  to  be  - not  the  Soviet Union,  not  Japan, 
not Europe- but  US  business  in Europe." 
In  the  US,  there  seems  to be  increasing doubt whether  European unification 
- which  so  far  has  been  a  constant goal  of  US  foreign  policy - has  in effect been 
beneficial  to  the US.  European  integration is said  to  have  developed  essentially 
in  the  economic  field whereas  progress  in  the political arena  has  been dis-
appointing.  Thus  Hestern  Europe  - personified  by  the  European  Community  - is 
increasingly seen as  a  major  economic  competitor.  This  threat  to American 
economic  power  has  not  been  balanced by  political advantages.  Thus  American 
apprehensions  about  European  economic  encroachments  become  still more vivid 
with  the present  European  Common  Market  of six nations  (Germany,  France,  Belgium, 
Netherlands,  Italy,  Luxembourg)  about  to  add  Great Britain,  Ireland,  Denmark, 
and  Non.ray  to its ranks. 
It is my  intention  today  to repudiate  such stereotypes. 
Without  denying  that  disagreements  exist,  I  contend  that: 
1)  the  European  Community  and  the  US  have  been beneficial for  each other 
over  the  past decade  (even if we  confine  our  considerations strictly to  the 
economic  area.) 
2)  the  enlargement  of  the  European  Community  suggests  no  change  in this 
basically favorable  relationship. - 3  -
I  should like to summarhe  now  the extent  to which  the US  has  benefitted 
from  the  Community.  particulariy in regard  to economic activity and  growth. 
(The  US  and  the  Common  Market  together account  for  38%  of world  trade. 
The  figure will be  55%  if the U.K.,  Ireland,  Denmark,  and  Norway  join the 
Common  Market.) 
The  total US  commodity  trade with  the  European  Community  now  exceeds 
three  times  the  level of  trade  in  1958,  when  the  Common  Market  was  formed. 
US  exports  to  the  Community  have  thus  risen from  about  3  billion to 9 billion. 
Today,  the  Community  is  the US's  best customer  -excepting Canada  - and  an 
expanded  Common  Harket  would  make  it the  number  one market  for  US  goods. 
Not  only  the  volume  of  transatlantic  trade  is  impressive,  the  pattern of  this 
trade  is equally significant:  the US  has  scored  a  consistent surplus  in its 
trade with  the  European  Community.  This  surplus  reached  the  2.4 billion mark 
1970.  The  figures  available for  1971  show  that  the  US  surplus with  the  European 
Community  reached  $625  million in  the first quarter,which is particularly 
significant  in a  period  when  the overall US  trade  balance  is beginning  to  show 
a  defic'' . 
Amon5  1:he  £actors  that  have  helped  considerably  the  growth  of  US  exports 
to  the  European  Community  has  been  the  rapid  rise  in  the  standard  of  living which 
accompanied  the  creation of  a  large single market  in  the  Community.  Indeed 
we  share  the  belief of  the  US  that  the  key  to economic  progress lies in 
competition.  The  establishment  of  the  European Ccmmunity  has  considerably 
enhanced  competition within  the  Common  Market  area,  which  in  turn has  boosted 
the  economic  growth  and  the  inherent  demand  for  investment  and  consumption 
goods.  This  situation doubtlessly has  encouraged  the  liberal orientation of 
trade  policy  in  the  European  Community. - 4  ..;. 
Another factor behind  the  growth  of  US  exports  to  the  European  Community 
has  been  the  establishment  of  the Community's  common  cust,.:>ms  tariff and 
the  reductions m&de  in this  tariff as  the result of  major  trade negotiations. 
TI1e  Community  is  now  surrounded by  the  lowest  tariff average  &~ong the  leading 
industrializect nations  (January  1,  1972:  6.9%  against  9.3%  for G.B.,  10.1% 
for  Japan,  10.9%  for  the US,not including  the  recent  10%  surcharge.) 
One  of  the  obviou~ results of  British entry into the  European Community 
would  be  the  reduction  of Britain's tariff  to  the  low  level of  the  Community's 
protection. 
The  economic  relations between  the  US  and  the  Community  not  only  include 
the  flow  of  commodities.  The  rising activity of American  firms  within  the 
Community  must  also be  taken  into account.  These  investments  progressed  from 
$1.9 billion in 1958  to  an  estimated book-value  of  $13  billion in 1970.  The 
sales  of  American  subsidiaries located  in  the  Community  are more  than  twice 
the  value  of  total American  exports  to  the  Community.  About  1  billion dollars 
in profits from  those direct investments  in  the  Community  were  repatriated 
last year.  Thus  the  US  economy  benefits doubly  from  European  integration: 
from  a  considerable  increase in US-European  Community  trade and  from  the 
impressive  income  growth  through  investments  in Europe.  Both make  a  major 
contribution  to  the credit side of  the  US  balance  of  payments. 
The  Community  is  one  of  the most  open  trade  areas  in  the world  - necessarily 
so because  of  its heavy  dependence  on  trade  for  the  development  of its GNP 
(trade accounts  for  20%  of  the  GNP  of  the  European  Communi.ty  and  only for  7% 
of  the US's  GNP). 
The  economic  structures of  the  UK  and  of  the  other  applicant countries 
are,  i.n  this  respect,  slmilar  to  the  structures of  the  Community  countries: 
a  large  percentage  of  GNP  is also dependent  on  foreign  trade.  Their policies - 5  -
towards direct US  investments  have  also been extremely liberal. 
~lhen countries with  open  trade  and  investment  policies decide  to merge 
into a  vast  economic  union  there  are  good  reasons  to believe  that  the 
subsequent  economic  blending will bring about  an  open  entity  where 
increased  competition creates increased wealth,  Logically  the  US  business 
world  should  contemplate  the  enlarged  European  Community  as a  more  prosperous 
client and  =  as  every  salesman  kno~..rs  very  ~..rell  - the more  prosperous  a  customer, 
the better chance  there is of  selling  to him.  (Incidentally, it is for  this 
very  reason  that  the  rich Americ .. n  market is an  important  factor  of vmrld 
trade.) 
The  EC's  trade  approach  is equally  "open"  in its relations with  developing 
nations.  The  EC  was  the first economic  entity to  follow  a  U.N.  recommendation 
intended  to  promote  industrialization  through  trade with  the developing nations 
of  the world.  On  June  1st of  this year,  the  EC  abolished  completely its customs 
duties  on  imports  of  finished  and  semi-finished  goods  produced  by  91  developing 
countries.  In  addition  to  these generalized  trade  preferences  applicable  to  the 
developing  countries,  the  Community  felt it had  a  special  responsibility  towards 
a  number  of  specific African  and  Mediterranean  countries.  The  latter enjoy not 
only  trade  preferences,  but also  special financial  and  technical assistance 
programs. 
Calculated  on  the  basis  of  GNP  percentages,  the  total European  Conmunity 
contribution  to  development  aid wasl.2  per cent  (whereas  the u.s.  share,  in 
relation  to its GNP,  amounts  to  .5  per cent)  in  1969. 
* * * 
American  fears  and  criticisms  tm..rards  the  European  Community  are greatest 
in  the  field of agriculture.  Preoccupations  dwell  both  on  access  to  the - 6  -
Community's  agricultural market  and  access  to  third country markets where 
U.S.  farm  expo~ts meet  competition from  European  farm  exports  aided by 
subsidies. 
The  fact is that  the  European  Community  remains  the  largest market  by 
far for U.S.  agricultural exports,  which  totalled  1.6 billion  (FOB)  in 1970. 
Since  1961•,  the  last year before  the  effects of  the  Common  Agricultural Policy 
(CAP)  made  themselves felt - the  Common  Market  share  of  Americ3n  farm  exports 
has  remained  steady  (between  21%  and  23%). 
During  this period,  American  farm  exports  to  the  Community  gre,.,  by  25% 
compared  to  20%  to  the whole  \Wrld  and  6.8%  to  the  rest of  Europe.  Not  all 
of  the u.s.  agricultural produce has  scored  the  fabulous  growth  of  soybean 
exports  to  the  European  Community  (91%  over  the  past five years).  Exports 
of  other agricultural commodities  remained  stable,  some  have  even dropped. 
Naturally,  such  divergent developments  reflect problems  for which  the 
CAP  serves  as  an  easy  scapegoat.  There  is also  the  problem  of  conflicting 
interests between  American  producers  and  exporters  of  interchangeable  and 
competing  products. 
Forty per cent of  U.S.  farm  exports enter  the  Community  facing neither 
duties nor quota  restrictions.  The  other sixty per cent undergo what  is 
or tariff, 
called  a  variable  levy  which  is  the basic  CAP  instrument  of protecting  the 
European  farmer  against  a  chaotic world market,  aga:l.nst  the world  market's 
abnormally  low  prices.  There  is no  point in denying  that  such  protection 
exists around  the  European agricultural market.  But  there is no  point either 
in pretending  that a  totally open,  non-protected agricultural market exists 
in any  of  the  industrialized states we  know.  The  methods  and  devices  of 
protection may  be different  from  one  country to another,  but  they exist in 
every  country. - 7  -
The  u.s.  protective system mainly consists  of  quotas.  "i'he  European 
Community  has  the variable levies.  Should  we  make  a  comparison  of  protection 
in the u.s.  and  the  European  Community?  Supposing,  for example,  all supports 
in all fotms  were  discontinued both  in  the u.s.  and  the  Common  Market.  This 
would  come  to  a  $1,300  per capita income  drop  in  the u.s.  and  a  $840  per 
capita drop  in the  European  Commun~.ty.  In other words,  competition between 
agriculture of different countries amounts  in  fact  to  competition between 
public  treasuries  of  these same  countries. 
Actually  the  European  Community  has  tried to get  to  the  roots  of  the 
agricultural policies.  Such  an  approach was  offered during  the Kennedy  Round. 
The  U.S.  said no. 
Will Britain's entry into  the  Common  Market  have  an  impact  on  the 
agricultural world  trade?  The  answer  is yes.  What  exactly  the  impact will be 
is difficult to predict.  There will be  no  problems  of  course,  for  products 
that have  no  tariffs,  such  as  soybeans.  (The  U.K.  will have  to eliminate its 
present  10%  duty  on  soybeans.  Most  of  the agricultural products  for which 
British entry may  cause  a  change  in  trade patterns - butter,  bacon,  sugar -
are not  of major importance  to u.s.  exporters. 
At  any  rate,  the  European  Community  is  committed  to  take special measures 
to  avoid  adverse effects  to  third  countries.  Mr.  Mansholt,  who  is the  CAP's 
chief  architect and  manager,  made  this clear in a  Minneapolis  speech  a  few 
months  ago. 
The  implication is  that  the  CAP  is not  a  rigid set of  protectionist 
devices.  It is a  practical and  relatively homogeneous  system,  replacing  the 
previously existing  panoplies  of different national  ··  and  often very restrictive -
regulations  in  the field of  agriculture.  It is  conceived according  to  European 0 
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agricultural situations,  yet it. alsa-..takes  into account  the  interest of 
Europevs  tradit:l.onal  trade partners. 
Finally,  the  CAP  is  the prerequisite for  the  structural  changes  that 
will allot'/  Europe  to achieve  successfully its green revolution. 
Fourteen per cent of  the  total working  population  in  the  European 
Community  is still employed  in agriculture.  The  corresponding figure  for  the 
United States is four  per cent. 
Half  a  million  people will leave  the agricultural sector  in  Europe  every 
year in  the  coming  decade. 
Allowing  this massive  process  to  take  place  smoothly  is  one  of  the  goals 
of  the  CAP. 
* * * 
You  naturally expect  this  survey of  European-American  economic  relations 
to  include  some  comment  or  reaction  from  me  on  the  present  economic  and  monetary 
situation,  and  on  the  possible  repercussions  on  the future  of  the  European 
Community  as well  as  on  our mutual  relationship. 
President  Nixon  said  that  reactions  abroad  to his  NEP  were  "measured  and 
constructive".  This  is certainly the  c.,.,e  for  the  E.c.  Indeed,  innnediate 
retaliation or  trade war were  ruled  out.  The  E.C.  countries  also have  reached 
a  common  position establishing  the groundrules  for  a  thorough  and  far-reaching 
reform  of  the  international monetary  system. 
Yet,  in  the New  Economic  Policy  package,  a  number  of measures  are  seen  as 
unilateral moves  t._rhich  violate existing international monetary  and  trade  rules 
and  which hit European  economies very hard. 
1.  The  floating  of  the dollar actually dismantled  the Hhole  basis  and 
framework  of  the  Bretton Woods  monetary  system established  some  25  years  ago. - 9  -
2.  The  ten  per cent surcharge hits about  88  per cent of  European exports 
on  the u.s.  market  and  is likely  to worsen  the already existing European 
trade deficit with  the u.s.  It also annuls unilaterally the effects of  the 
Kennedy  Round  negotiations. 
3.  The  10  per  cent credit on  new  investments  includes  an  additional trade 
discrimination - in fact,  it is a  typical  example  of  a  very si-zeable non-
tariff barrier  since  this  tax credit is applicable only if the  investments 
concerned  relate  to  equipment  made  in the USA. 
4.  The  Domestic  International Sales  Corporation is seen  as  a  form  of  export 
subsidy. 
The  cumulative  consequences  of  these measures  provoke  a  sudden shift in 
tariff barriers of  up  to  30%  for  some  European  goods, 
Some  of  these  problems  - like  the  floating  of  the dollar and  the  10% 
surcharge - are  understood  to  be  of  a  temporary  nature.  Yet  no  indication 
exists as  to  how  temporary  these measures  ~·;ill  be.  Consequently,  the whole 
world  and  especially  ~vestern  Europe  feels  not  only  the  shock effect of  the 
measures  but  finds  it extremely difficult  to  cope  constructively with  the 
situation. 
Above,  all the decisions  announced  by  President  Nixon  on  August  15th are 
seen  by  Europeans  not  as  a  routine  economic  incident but  as  a  turning  point 
in  the  history of international,  political,  economic  and  monetary  developments. 
The  problems  deriving  from  the  U.S.  decislons  not  only  involve  the  reform 
of  the  international monetary  system  and  the  elimination of  obstacles  to 
world  trade.  These  problems  are  also  connected  with  financial participation in 
defense.  The  crucial issue  is not  the dollar but  the  reshaping  of  the monetary, 
commercial  and  political pattern of  the  ~vest, - 10  -
Under  these  circumstances,  it would  not  be  reasonable  to assume  that 
<:limple  answers  can  be  found  to  the  problems  '"e  face.  Also,  in this initial 
phase  of a  vast  process  of global readjustments,  we  must  realize that tactical 
considerations  play an  important part which,  most  likely, will be  an  additional 
obstacle  to  immediate  solutions. 
Unfortunately,  the  European Community  is confronted with  this external 
process of  readjustment at a  time when  it is also going  through  a  delicate 
phase  of internal readjustment:  the  transition from  a  Community  of six nations 
into a  Community  of  ten nations  and  the building of  its own  economic  and 
monetary union. 
Consequently,  the first priority of  the  Community  will be  to strengthen 
its own  structure,  to avoid  the  temptation  of  a  return  to national bilateralism 
which  would  deprive  the  European  Community  of its only weapon:  concerted action 
to defend  the  interest of its countries.  Together,  the  Community  countries 
fonn  the most  formidable  trading  and  monetary unit  in  the \Wrld.  Divided  we 
have  the means  neither to defend our interest nor  to participate in the creation 
of  a  better international monetary order. 
The  other goal of  the  Community  will be  to prevent  forthcoming  developments 
from  leading  to  a  worldwide  recession. 
Until recently,  initiatives of  the u.s.  Government  provoked  criticisms but 
no  concrete  and  constructive proposals  from  the  European  side.  The  mid-August 
unilateral American  measures  dramatized  the  ineffectual decision-making machinery 
of  the  European  Community. 
Hm.,rever,  the  most  recent  Common  Harket's  Council  of Ministers meeting  in 
Brussels  as  \.,rell  as  the  "Group  of  Ten"  meeting  in London,  demonstrated  that 
European  cohesion  is  improving. - 11  -
It must  be stressed that  the  emerging  European  cohesion and  solidarity 
is not  oriented  against  anybody,  and  certainly not against  the United States. 
It is fully understood  in  Europe  that it is in nobody's  interest not  to help 
the  United  States out  of  its present difficulties.  But  in order  to be 
successful,  our cooperation must  be  a  t~-1o-way movement.  This very idea of 
mutual  concessions  underlies  the  European  Community's  latest positions: 
1)  The  reforms  to be carried out within  the  international monetary  system 
must  respect  the principle of  fixed  parities.  Such  a  system is necessary for 
the  orderly  transa~and expansion  of  trade,  in which  the Community,  as 
the most  important  trading unit,  is particularly interested. 
This will only  be  possible if a  differentiated realignment is introduced 
in parity relations between currencies of industrialized countries.  Such  a 
realignment  should  include  the currencies of all countries  concerned,  includina 
the dollar. 
2)  The  correct functioning  of  such  a  reformed  international monetary  system 
requires measures  such  as  a  limited  increase  in fluctuation bands  in order  to 
compensate for  the  consequences  of interest rate differences  and  of  appropriate 
measures  to  discourage  short-term capital movements. 
3)  International reserve  assets will continue  to depend  upon  gold~ and  to 
an  increasing degree,  upon  a  collectively and  internationally created  and  managed 
reserve system.  This  calls for  the  adaptation and  the  development  of  the  special 
drawing  rights system  in connection with  a  gradual decrease  in the  importance  of 
national  currencies as  reserve assets. 
4)  The  new  international payments  balance  can  only be maintained if, ln 
the  future,  all countries  or  associations  of  countries  respect  the  obligations 
involved  in  the  adjustment  process  of  the balance  of  payments  and  if they - 12  -
implement  appropriate internal policies. 
5)  Within  the framework  of  the  reformed  international monetary  system, 
the authority and  range of action of  the  I.M.F.  must  be  reinforced in ail 
fields of  competence. 
I  started on  a  literary note,  I  may  just as well end  the  same  way.  The 
word  "crisis" is expressed  in Chinese with  two  different signs:  the first 
sign means  "risk",  the  second  "opportunities".  This  is, in short,  the state 
of affairs that  confront  the U.S.,  Europe,  and  U.S.-European relations  today. 
Guy  Vanhaeverbeke 
Deputy Director 
II  If  II 
European  Community  Information  Service 
2100  M Street,  N.W.,  Suite  707 
Washington,  D.C.  20037 